

UAS Operators Safety and Reliability Survey: Emerging Technologies Towards the Certification of Autonomous UAS

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Abstract— This paper details the results of a survey on safety and reliability of commercial Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), issued to 1500 companies in the UK, with a 10% response rate. The results of this study concur with previous studies that commercial UAS have a failure rate of $1/10^3$ flight hours. Furthermore, we found a reported 49% of companies believe a critical failure will occur within every 500 hours of flight. We investigate the responses concerning UAS subsystems; the experience of onboard intelligent systems, current practices around the frequency of maintenance and servicing of subsystems, and subsystems identified in order of the highest likelihood of failure. Informed by the results of this survey and a state of the art literature review we identify emerging technologies and methods as candidate solutions to the respondents reported challenges, such as; Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM), Formal Methods, Simulations and Fault Tolerant Control (FTC). The integration of these techniques, in a systematic framework with a supporting automatic tool-chain, is identified as a candidate solution to reliability and certification challenges in UAS.

Index Terms—autonomous systems, drones, health management, prognostics, reliability, safety, unmanned aerial system.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we detail the results of a survey issued to commercial Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) operators in the UK about the safety and reliability of commercial UAS¹. UAS usage is forecast to grow substantially [1], our skies will quickly become more congested, yet there is little regulation and training around managing interactions between UAS and other air space users. As of September 2019 there were 5,383 operators approved, by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), for small unmanned aircraft (≤ 20 kg). To ensure public trust in the approval practices of the CAA there needs to be greater understanding of best practices and technological capabilities in regards to ensuring safety in their operations.

¹The term UAS will be utilised in this paper in respect of the Civil Aviation Authority's (CAA) demonstrated preference to this term. UAS refers to remotely piloted and autonomous systems and allows for consideration of sub-components such as the human in the loop and communication technologies.

In the identification of the challenges in safe and reliable performance of these UAS, candidate technologies such as onboard intelligence to mitigate the onset of failure modes whilst in operation is of particular interest. Artificial Intelligence (AI) has seen significant investment in industry and academia in terms of its role in distributed intelligence and decision making for safety critical systems [2] [3] [4]. Such onboard intelligence is yet to make significant inroads with UAS, for instance Neural Networks offer limited use for these safety critical systems due to their non-deterministic properties and increased hardware and processing requirements. The Certification Specifications detailed by the CAA CAP 722 [5] require onboard intelligence to be performed deterministically.

The paper is structured into the following sections, Section II details the creation of the survey whilst Section III illustrates the questions and responses to the survey and discusses findings. Section IV compares related work in UAS reliability to the results found in our survey, Section V discusses emerging technologies in UAS safety and automation, Section VI makes recommendations for future work in safety and reliability for robotic systems and concludes the findings of the paper.

II. METHODOLOGY

This section provides details of the methodology used to capture the challenges and best practices from UK companies.

A. Aim

To engage with experts in the commercial UAS sector to elicit first hand experience of UAS safety and reliability. Identifying common failures and perceptions within the industry of onboard intelligent systems.

B. Design

A short, electronic survey, less than 5 minutes in length with simplified questions, designed in order to maximise participation. Distributed electronically through SurveyMonkey.

C. Demographic

Approved UK based commercial UAS operators.

D. Sample Size

The CAA maintain a list of approved commercial operators, these are individuals and organisations which utilise Small Unmanned Aircraft (not exceeding 20kg). The list utilised was last updated on the 01/09/19 when there were 4908 entries.

From that list companies which did not deal with UAS, were no longer trading or whose licenses had expired were removed. 1500 valid contact details were elicited from those that remained, these were all contacted, of which 155 companies responded, a response rate of just over 10%, this was deemed statistically adequate.

E. Analysis

Limitations with the sample set were; it excluded approved UAS operators with no web presence and those commercial operators not approved by the CAA.

Q2, Q6 and Q9 were too broad for the sample size, future work would structure response options differently or increase the sample size to reach a lower margin of error.

III. SURVEY RESULTS IN SAFETY AND RELIABILITY

A. Question 1: Are you an approved CAA operator?




Fig. 1. CAA approved respondent (m.e. ± 0.028 , c.i. 0.95)

This question ensured commercial operators were targeted, those with investment and experience in UAS operations. 95% of respondents are CAA approved UAS operators, as shown in Fig.1.

B. Question 2: Which sector(s) does your company fit into?




Fig. 2. Percentage of respondents from each commercial sector

Fig.2 illustrates that the majority of respondents operate in the Photography, Film, Surveying or Construction sectors. Respondent's companies generally operate over multiple sectors, just 19.4% of companies reported to operate in one sector.

The various types of UAS platforms used, coupled with the sector's operational performance demands will influence their reliability. Safety requirements also play a part in the acceptable level of performance depending upon each use case. Larger companies typically operate with a significant increase in hardware and software sophistication as well as training and maintenance routines. The intention was to find the common failure modes independent of operating costs or platform complexity and performance levels.

C. Question 3: For routine flight operations, please estimate a mean time before a non-critical failure typically occurs?




Fig. 3. Estimated mean time before a non-critical failure typically occurs

As shown in Fig.3 the most likely time for a non-critical² failure was between 10 to 50 hours of operation, although 13.2% of respondents reported non-critical failures within 1 to 10 hrs. This highlights the relative complexity and platform dependence on regular health checks to maintain flight readiness. The responses depend to some extent on a company's maintenance procedures and build quality of UAS.

D. Question 4: For routine flight operations, please estimate a mean time before a critical failure typically occurs?

As shown in Fig.4 half of respondents reported that a critical failure would not occur until after 500 flight hours. It should be pointed out that options for 1000 hours or above were not provided, which may have biased the results. The commercial aviation failure rate is about 1 in 100,000 flight hours whereas for UAS, it has been found to be 1 in 1000 flight hours [1]. It could be argued that this falls in line with the survey data if the 50% of respondents reporting greater than 500 flight hours falls into a normal distribution with a mean of 1000. Despite

²Non-critical failures are defined as those that do not compromise mission objectives or safety. This was not explicitly defined in the survey.




Fig. 4. Estimated mean time before a critical failure typically occurs during routine flight operations

this 4.2% of operators reported critical³ failures occurring within 50 hours, largely companies based in the Research, Film or Photography sectors, an additional 16.8% within 100 hours. These types of failures are of particular interest for robust fail-safe systems.

E. Question 5: Please estimate how many mishaps might be avoided with increased onboard intelligence to aid the pilot per 100 flight hours.




Fig. 5. Estimated mishaps which may be avoided with increased onboard intelligence per 100 flight hours

As shown in Fig.5 51.5% of respondents estimated that between 1 to 5 mishaps per 100 hours of operation could be avoided with onboard intelligent systems. Whilst 19.2% of respondents said that there was no need for further onboard intelligent systems to avoid mishaps. The responses show that there is, at least from 80.8% of users, a demand for the development or the supply of intelligent systems to aid the

³Critical failures are defined as those that compromise mission objectives or safety. This was not explicitly defined in the survey.

safe operation of UAS. 11.4% of operators suggested that the demand for greater intelligence may mitigate greater than 20 mishaps per 100 flight hours, these operators who see onboard intelligence as highly beneficial largely operate in the Engineering and Surveying sectors.

F. Question 6: Please rank the following subsystems into the order of those you think most likely to fail. Those most likely at the top.




Fig. 6. Ranked subsystems by likelihood of failure

Fig.6 shows that the highest ranked subsystems to protect from failure were transmitter and communication systems. Closely followed by navigation systems and battery pack failures. Mechanical failures are a lower priority, such as rotor blade damage, brushless motor failures or body structure failures. In terms of the frequency of failure, the aforementioned components are robustly engineered for higher reliability on current commercial platforms.

G. Question 7: Please place in order of importance, technologies that you think would be most beneficial for commercial UAS operations, the most important at the top.




Fig. 7. Ranked technologies by benefit to commercial UAS operations

Responses shown in Fig.7 show respondent's highest ranked intelligent technologies were advanced warning systems for

battery failures, closely followed by advanced warning of electrical or mechanical failures. Also ranked highly in Fig.7 are fault tolerant stability and control and intelligent power management. Collision avoidance and GPS denied navigation was reported as lower down on the list of priorities. This is partly due to technology already being available in this area, those who still rated it highly were from more resource restrained sectors, Film and Photography.

H. Question 8: Please indicate the type of health checks that you carry out during a UAS lifetime.




Fig. 8. Health checks carried out during a UAS's lifetime

Fig.8 illustrates that nearly all operators carry out regular checks in the workshop before operations, immediately before take-off (on-site) and carry out post flight checks. Only 70% of respondents carry out scheduled maintenance, of these 31% use a specialist third party service provider. The high value placed on these regular maintenance checks may promote the use of onboard diagnostic and prognostic technology to better provide condition based maintenance.

I. Question 9: Please indicate approximately the number of hours flown between any scheduled maintenance.




Fig. 9. Approximated hours flown between any scheduled maintenance

Servicing is generally carried out after 20 to 50 hours of flight time for most companies, as shown Fig.9. 17.4% of companies reported that servicing was carried out within 5

hours of flight time. A fairly large proportion of companies, 11.4%, did not have any scheduled maintenance. This could also be better supported with onboard diagnostic and prognostic technology.

It is worth noting that those from potentially smaller businesses such as Film and Photography were more likely to have no scheduled maintenance than other sectors. Those from Engineering and Security companies are more likely to have lower flight hours flown between scheduled maintenance.

J. Question 10: Please comment on any other technology you believe might improve UAS flight safety.




Fig. 10. Other technologies to improve UAS flight safety

The individual responses provided a valuable insight into the commercial experience of UAS safety and reliability. Fig.10 categorises the types of improvements recommended. There is clearly a high demand for Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) transponders and for rigorous pilot training. A few respondents experienced no failures during many years of operations. However over 50% of responses related to some form of onboard intelligent augmentation of the current platforms. Some comments do not relate to onboard intelligence, relating instead to improvements in safety and reliability in general, with operator training or in legislation. We believe a balance between automation, legislation and training will provide a complete safety and reliability solution.

IV. RELATED WORK

Previous studies into UAS reliability for military and commercial UAS technology have focused on establishing more efficient intervals for maintenance activities [6]. Petritoli, Lecce and Ciani present a hierarchy of reliability for UAS for every 1000 failures. They report that reliability of commercial UAS has been verified at about $1/10^3$ flight hours, whereas

civil aircraft have two orders of magnitude more reliable systems at $1/10^5$ flight hours. They cite the most frequent failures for UAS occur from the Power Plant, (411), Ground Control Station, (273), and Navigation Systems, (146). This is broadly in line with our study although we primarily collected data for Lithium Ion Power Plants and multi-rotor systems as opposed to liquid-fuelled, fixed wing systems, the frequency of failures for the power plant are high for both types of system, although as the authors state, the power plant itself is fairly reliable but the combination of software, power delivery subsystems and communication systems mean that power delivery can fail due to a number of sensitive dependencies.

It is also worth noting the difference found between military systems and commercial UAS. Where military UAS are designed and operated closer to component limits for increased range, autonomy and performance a higher failure rate is observed. This is despite individual components and greater redundancy of subsystems being deployed in the military arena with the associated costs involved [6]. Petritoli, Leccese and Ciani also note that redundancy of systems is not the only answer, although system safety is improved as a whole, paradoxically this also increases the failure rates requiring more frequent maintenance. An alternative can also be over-sizing and derating to increase single component reliability to maintain safe levels of performance and reduce the need for maintenance to be more cost effective.

V. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES IN ASSISTING THE CERTIFICATION OF AUTONOMOUS UAS

A. *Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM)*

IVHM is a field emerging from the Aerospace sector, for large scale complex safety critical and supply chain driven operations, for example civil aviation and space systems [7]. The premise is that onboard data, prognostics and maintenance planning is more cost effective when the maintenance activity is data driven and planned in advance. This forms the basis of a condition based maintenance program as opposed to traditional scheduled maintenance programs. The concepts used on larger commercial systems are of interest for smaller scale platforms to provide safety and reliability improvements at a reasonable cost. The costs depend upon the selection of sensors, design and validation work and additional data infrastructure to manage the real-time and historical information during operations from critical components and subsystems. A reduction in costs, driven by condition based maintenance programs would be popular with many resource restrained businesses, as illustrated in our qualitative data.

Zhang et al, [8] propose a framework for an IVHM system. The framework refers to large commercial aircraft operations and big data collection whereby important health information such as engine, flight control systems, hydraulic systems, environmental control systems, landing gear systems and fuel systems are collected for analysis. The flight control parameters and sensor data are used for maintenance decisions using Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) algorithms at a

data centre. Historical data is used to serve future fault diagnosis and prediction and timely decision-making information is exploited for the advanced notice of maintenance procedures.

Roemer et al. [9] in *The Handbook of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles* detail IVHM and Automated Contingency Management (ACM) systems architecture to support real-time, onboard health state assessment and fault management of UAS. A hierarchical architecture is described including control reconfiguration, and high-level reasoning. The dynamics and performance limitations of the damaged system are also estimated on-line in real time. Adaptive reconfigurable flight controllers are utilised to stabilise and recover the system using the system dynamic model. Based on the health assessment and newly identified UAS dynamics, the operational flight envelope parameters, such as maximum speed and power consumption, can be assessed to ensure safe flight regimes.

B. *Prognostics and Health Management (PHM)*

PHM is the science of predicting future events based on system knowledge and measurements of the system and environment, it is a growing field of interest which has its roots in many industries, with knowledge gained from areas such as Aerospace engine management, Lithium-Ion battery life prognostics, electrical component failure prognostics, engineering reliability techniques and autonomous space systems, specifically work carried out at the Intelligent Systems Division at NASA [10].

When the system is found to be operating at off-nominal conditions, physics based modelling, data driven techniques and prediction algorithms must be used to estimate the remaining useful life of components and subsystems. This forms the health management strategy of the engineering system in question. These techniques can be applied to many and varied subsystems within an engineering application.

A critical component for any electric vehicle being the battery has meant much interest and research has been carried out into the accurate estimation of the remaining useful life of the battery for both mission time prognostics, State-Of-Charge (SOC) and maintenance, State-Of-Health (SOH) prognostics. Numerous studies into battery SOC techniques have been carried out, e.g. the use of Neural Nets [11], Unscented Kalman Filters [12], [13], Unscented Transform [14], Hardy Space H_∞ Observers [15] and Physics Based models [16]. The Coulomb counting and Open Circuit Voltage (OCV) vs SOC lookup table technique combined with Equivalent Circuit Models (ECMs) and variations of the Kalman Filter are the predominant techniques currently applicable to UAS for online applications [17]. The most sophisticated platforms also employ impedance spectroscopy techniques for both SOC and SOH assessments [18].

The most significant error sources are due to current sensor drift, cell ageing, cell manufacturing variations, temperature effects, and hysteresis phenomenon. The battery SOH can be derived by several methods although there are two key techniques; the first is the use of experimental data collected over a large number of battery cycles and the second, adaptive

methods where cell degradation must be derived as parameterised equations to determine the effect of a number of cell measurements. Adaptive measurements have higher computational loads whereas experimental data collection is very time consuming and expensive [19]. Specialised diagnostic measurements such as Coulombic efficiency and impedance spectroscopy can also be used for lifetime estimation.

Most recently Severson et al. [20] developed a machine learning technique using discharge voltage curves from early cycles to predict capacity degradation. Worries about battery failure rates were highlighted in Q.7 of the survey where “Battery Failure” was ranked the third most likely subsystem to fail. Battery lifespan and desire for redundancies in batteries were highlighted in the gathered qualitative data, for instance “Battery redundancy”, “Battery power/temperature issue notifications” and “Better battery technologies”, these were sourced from those respondents working in the Surveying sector which may indicate the desire for longer surveying missions than the current battery technology allows.

Other areas of interest for UAS prognostics include structural, electrical, software and mechanical fault monitoring. Glover et al [21], discussed the use of a novel approach to PHM for manned and unmanned aerial systems that combine a Functional Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FFMEA) with a reasoning system. They discuss the effective integration of the system from the design stage as being key to the benefit of a PHM system. They also describe the use of ‘JACK’ and ‘MADe’ two commercial software tools and the accuracy and advantages of their implementation on an engine health application. The effectiveness of PHM as a design optimisation tool is limited however to the baseline reliability of the subsystem components as found by [22]. They found that an already highly reliable ElectroHydrostatic Actuator (EHA) used on a manned fighter jet did not benefit from PHM technology in the design process.

Zermani et al [23] present the use of Bayesian networks for the monitoring of embedded applications for UAS. They exploit the use of reconfigurable computing Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). They highlight the importance of onboard resources and time constraints as well as precision as being crucial for autonomous systems like UAS where it is beneficial to reconfigure dynamically the system in an emergency scenario.

C. Formal Methods

As a result of increasing autonomy, the development, verification and certification of autonomous robots is becoming inherently difficult due to the sheer complexity of the system design [24]–[26]. Testing based techniques have limitations in assuring the safety of autonomous robots, e.g. both [27], [28] show the infeasibility of demonstrating the safety of self-driving cars from road testing alone, and [27], [29] explicitly argue the need for alternative verification methods to supplement testing. Aligned with this idea, [28] proposes a Bayesian approach to combine supplement verification evidence as prior knowledge to the testing. Formal methods e.g. model checking

and theorem proving, offer an opportunity in providing such alternative verification evidence, which indeed has received great attention [30], [31].

In particular, we confine ourselves to Probabilistic Model Checking (PMC) in this paper, since there are inevitably uncertainties in the operation of modern autonomous robots, and probabilistic models are the natural way to capture such uncertainties faced by the systems. PMC [32] has been successfully used to analyze quantitative properties of systems across a variety of application domains, including robotics [31]. The basic steps of PMC are:

- Constructing a probabilistic model – commonly using Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC), Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) or Markov Decision Process (MDP) (when considering non-deterministic actions in the modelling) – that formally represents the behaviour of a system over time.
- Specifying the properties of interest with tools such as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) or Probabilistic Computational Tree Logic (PCTL).
- Finally in automatic tools like PRISM [33] and STORM [34], a systematic exploration is performed to check if a claimed property holds against the probabilistic model.

As mentioned, PMC, as a variant of model checking techniques, emphasises the inherent uncertainties of the formalised system. In [35], [36], the complex and uncertain behaviours of robot swarms are analysed by PMC to assess whether swarms will indeed behave as required. In [37], PMC is used to synthesis and verify the control policies of robots in partially unknown environments.

In a hostile environment, the movements of adversaries are modelled probabilistically by MDP [38] whilst PMC finds a control strategy that maximises the probability of accomplishing the mission objective. The reliability and performance of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) is guaranteed by reconfiguration (optimised by PMC) [39], [40] when sensor failures occur. In the modelling of UAS missions, both [41], [42] use PMC to synthesis the optimal controller of multiple UAS, discussing their limitations in this context with potential solutions.

There is a notorious problem for most (if not all) model checking techniques; verification assumes the formal model (i.e. a DTMC in PMC) accurately reflects the actual behaviour of the real-world system [43]. It becomes an even tougher issue for systems in changing, unexpected environments and with autonomous features. To handle the issue, the appealing idea of doing runtime PMC was proposed in [44], [45] whose essence is to keep the formal model alive and continuously update it when seeing new data at runtime.

Although runtime PMC has been extensively studied for other software-intensive systems, there is little research on runtime PMC for robots. To the best of our knowledge, the first work of runtime PMC on robots is credited to [46] in which it focuses on improving the scalability of runtime PMC by using software engineering techniques. Then in [47], we propose advanced Bayesian estimators which considers robotics features

to update the formal model at runtime. For instance, due to the safety-critical feature of robots deployed in assets inspection missions, the Conservative Bayesian Inference (CBI) estimator [48]–[50] was introduced to provide conservative estimates on catastrophic failure related model parameters.

In summary, formal methods build a mathematically rigorous model of a complex system (e.g. UAS) and then verify the system’s properties in a more thorough fashion than simulated/operational testing. It has been shown that runtime PMC, as a variant of model checking techniques, is particularly useful in assuring autonomous robots deployed in extreme environments, as well as a technology for manufacturers to introduce to reduce the volume of critical and non-critical failures through pilot awareness and intervention.

D. Simulation

Similar to formal methods, simulation based testing is frequently used in academia and industry to design, develop, verify and certify autonomous robots. The case for when to use simulation based testing rather than formal methods are nuanced, Matt Schmittle et al. claim that researchers prefer simulations due to the lowered barriers to flight, particularly the reduction in cost of flight (as evidenced in survey data, where we see that UAS in the Research sector are suffering frequent critical failures Fig.4 and non-critical failures Fig.3) and the time saving in terms of health and safety [51], yet these same arguments may be used in the case for formal methods.

Unlike formal methods, simulations may be easily modified, allowing researchers who are operating in complex environments to adjust their system’s variables and assets to analyse the effects on the outputs from the simulation.

Crucially simulations allow for expedited, repetitive runs of a scenario under multiple different values of selected variables, something which for many researchers would not be practical within their time constraints. The main argument against simulation is that to accurately simulate a scenario the entirety of reality needs to be simulated, something which is currently too complex for us to simulate.

The solution many researchers utilise is to model only those areas about which they are concerned, such a model may then be integrated into a larger, simplified overarching system model. Such methodology is practical, yet sub-optimal, without fully modelling the entire system, unforeseen issues may still arise. Conversely probabilistic model checking may handle these large, complex probabilistic systems [52].

Finally many simulators require long periods of time for their initial installation coupled with a demand for powerful hardware. Ana Cavalcanti et al. believe that the current state of simulators is ad hoc and unverifiable [53], they are in the process of creating a solution to the problem of how to model and consistency check such simulations. There are numerous popular software tools used to simulate autonomous robots e.g. Gazebo [54], ARGoS [55], Webots [56] and CARLA [57].

As well as a more limited selection of software tools designed to specifically simulate UAS: OpenUAV [51], UAV CRAFT [58] and AirSim [59], [60].

Software such as OpenUAV, AirSim and Gazebo have the advantage of being open source and free. Gazebo is already widely used in industry and academia, in part due to its licensing agreements, but also, it’s partnership with the Robotic Operating System (ROS) [61] which utilises Gazebo as part of its offerings to users.

E. Fault Tolerant Control

Damage to rotor blades and power loss to rotors on multi-rotor UAS constitutes a critical failure if the flight controller is unable to maintain safe flight. However to further increase safety a number of research institutions have developed fault tolerant control techniques for multi-rotor UAS. Early work at MIT and Stanford formed the standard techniques, Model Referenced Adaptive Control (MRAC) or reallocating controllers in the event of failure detection. Zhang et al. [62] provides an extensive review of these techniques.

Fear of faults was highlighted in the qualitative data provided by respondents to Question 10 (other technology you believe may improve UAS flight safety, Fig.10):

“A flight controller that can compensate for the failure of one or more rotary/motor failures”
– **Environmental sector**

“Stability enhancements for when 1 or more motors fail”
– **Surveying/Photography sector**

There have been successful experimental demonstrations of flight recovery from partial and total loss of rotor blades have been shown at Columbia University [63] as well as flight with the loss of 1, 2 and 3 rotor blades on a quadrotor at ETH Zurich [64]. The technology operates at the flight controller level by detecting off-nominal flight behaviour via Fault Detection and Diagnostic algorithms (FDD). The technology acts either passively, via controllers that accommodate failure, or actively, via reallocation of controllers to manage flight by switching to new flight dynamic modes to prevent uncontrolled descent of the air-frame. Further research into L_1 controllers at Cranfield University has shown potential improvements in reliability for hexrotor and octo-rotor configurations [65].

F. Air Traffic Control (ATC) Technology

As the demand for UAS increases the need for increased development of Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLoS) technology is required. Operation within this region is permitted if an approved method of collision avoidance and aerial separation is used. Alternatively, the aircraft can be flown in a segregated airspace using Instrument Flight Controls (IFR) and using Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance [66].

Radar is a prerequisite for UAS traffic management systems. A radar onboard a UAS confers upon the operator and autopilots greater situational awareness, detection and avoidance of other aerial vehicles [66]. Radar can be used in multiple weather conditions, during the day or night.

ADS-B can also be used to gain an understanding of airspace. Aircraft can determine their exact location using

a high accuracy GPS. This location can be broadcast to other nearby aircraft and ADS-B ground stations. The ground stations will send this information to air traffic control towers. Aircraft will broadcast their position continuously and if the hardware is onboard the aircraft, it will also be able to receive the broadcast from other aircraft. This continuous and therefore up to date cycle of broadcasts gives pilots and air traffic control an understanding of what is in their airspace. ADS-B is automatic and no extra action is required for the data to be broadcast. The aircraft sending the broadcast may not be aware of who is receiving the information [67].

Question 7 of our survey highlighted the desire for Enhanced Collision Avoidance, as shown in Fig.7 and coupled with some qualitative data from Question 10, Fig.10:

“Transponders that may be seen by air traffic control”
– **Construction sector**

“A platform which allows UAS operators to see other operators in the area”
– **Survey sector**

These illustrate the desire for improved communication and awareness of other airspace users, between operators and ATC as well as between operators. UAS are at risk of collision with other aircraft, ensuring ATC and other pilots and operators in the area were aware of one another through the use of such onboard technology would help to manage this risk.

G. Assurance Cases

Assurance cases are generally developed to support claims in areas such as safety, reliability, maintainability and security. These assurance cases are often called by some more specific names, e.g. safety cases [68] and security cases [69]. A safety case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification of the safety of a system for a given application in a defined operating environment, thus it is a means to provide the grounds for confidence and to assist decision making in certification [70]. Indeed, safety cases are mandatory in UK regulation for systems used in safety-critical applications, e.g. nuclear energy, medical devices and air traffic control. Thus, developing assurance cases is an inevitable and also important step in UAS certification, the following is a list of the cutting edge research topics related to assurance cases:

- Structured and graphical notations: early research in assurance cases mainly focus on their formulation in terms of claims, arguments and evidence elements based on fundamental argumentation theories like the Toulmin model [71]. The two most popular notations are CAE [70] and GSN [72] and both provide supporting tools.
- Methodologies in assisting safety case construction: to reduce the effort required in developing safety cases, researchers are looking into safety argument patterns in GSN [73] and reusing blocks in CAE [74] which are derived from extensive empirical analysis of real cases.
- Assessing confidence in safety cases: As arguments and evidence in practice are imperfect, we can never be

certain a claim will hold. We may want to quantify confidence in safety cases [75]. Methods based on underlying theories of Bayesian Belief Networks and Dempster-Shafer theory are proposed [76]–[79]. For a detailed review, see [80]. It is worth mentioning that Rushby classifies the safety arguments into deductive and inductive arguments which require differing treatment in propagating confidence in cases [81].

- Model-driven safety cases: for a better integration with other activities in the development process and to combine the benefits of model-driven engineering, model-driven safety cases are proposed, e.g. [82], [83].
- Dynamic safety cases: Due to increasing use of autonomous systems that handle environmental and internal uncertainties by dynamically adjusting their configurations. The notion of dynamic safety cases are proposed to provide a basis of continuously assuring safety requirements [84], [85].

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper the results of a Safety and Reliability Survey issued to UK CAA approved operators have been presented, highlighting the types of failures most frequently observed in commercial operation. The frequency of failures found in operations for both critical and non-critical sub-systems are quantified and the need for onboard intelligent safety systems identified. The results of the survey have been compared and contrasted to previous studies into UAS safety and reliability and the most common concerns and recommendations have been presented from operator responses. Based on the identified challenges, a review on candidate technologies and methods has been presented that align with the challenges of safety and reliability in UAS for generating verification & validation (V&V) evidence to facilitate certification.

With the increasing presence of UAS in a myriad of markets and a technology trend that forecasts increasing interaction between people, infrastructure and robotics, solutions are required that support safe guarding people and infrastructure. With increasing autonomy of UAS more advanced methods are required to account for dynamic changes in the environment and within the UAS platform. Globally, constraints on BVLOS cite reliability as one of the key bottlenecks to increased UAS adoption. To develop a solution for this significant challenge, the technologies reviewed in this paper provide the basis of both improving and certifying their safety and reliability. A trend is to integrate the above mentioned techniques [53], [86] in a systematic certification framework and the need for an automated tool-chain for the design and implementation of such a framework forms important future work.

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